In recent years, many governments and international institutions have adopted policies designed to increase national integration into the global economy. People have reacted with great passion to these policies, at times violently. Whether or not one supports it, most would agree that the scope of economic globalization has expanded in recent decades. At the same time, the number of countries with ongoing civil wars and the proportion of these states in the system have increased. Are these two developments related? The civil war literature presents competing theoretical expectations about the effects of globalization on civil wars. One set of theories expects globalization to reduce the likelihood of civil wars. A second set expects the opposite. A third view implies that globalization should have a negligible effect on civil wars. This paper addresses the question of whether states that are more integrated into the global economy are less likely than others to face civil war. This question has important policy implications, since globalization is expected to con-tinue and grow. Thus far, alternative views about the effect of globalization on civil war have been subject to almost no large-N empirical investigations. We seek to contribute to the literature by investigating hypotheses on some of the covariates of civil war within the context of the debate over globalization.
In our analysis, the unit of analysis is the country-year. The dependent variable, civil war, is measured in two ways: its presence and onset. Globalization is measured from international trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign portfolio investment (FPI), and Internet use. These forces are considered along with other variables the literature identifies as potential determinants of civil war. The analysis includes countries with available data for the period 1970-99. Our results reveal that states that are more open to the flow of trade, FDI, and FPI are less likely to experience civil war. Internet use, in general, does not affect the likelihood of civil war.
In the next section, we discuss conflicting theories on why and how globalization affects civil war. Next, we present our research design. This is followed by a discussion of our findings. We conclude by discussing the implications of our results for policymaking and future research.
Theories of Economic Globalization and Civil War
The effect of economic globalization on civil war has recently become a subject of theoretical debate. In one set of theories, globalization promotes peace. In a second set, it promotes civil war. A third view implies that globalization may not affect civil war.
Globalization Reduces the Risk of Civil War
Globalization is said to reduce the risk of civil war through seven channels. PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT. Neoclassical economics argues that free markets promote economic development. Globalization simply entails the global spread of free markets. Openness to trade, FDI, and FPI enables allocation of production factors to their most efficient uses, promoting development, which strengthens the government, providing it with more revenues as the tax base is larger. Richer states, in turn, can have stronger police and military, deterring potential rebels. Richer countries also can have better infrastructure and administrative capacity, strengthening central control. In addition, richer people should have fewer grievances toward governments than poor and should be less likely to revolt. Lastly, civil wars entail opportunity costs that should be higher for rich states (e.g., income that rebels could earn in the labor force, fighting expenses that could be utilized for growth). Development, therefore, should deter rebellions, thus promoting peace (Fearon and 
Globalization Raises the Risk of Civil War
Globalization is said to raise the likelihood of civil war through several channels. PROMOTING UNDERDEVELOPMENT. According to dependency theory, trade and foreign investment harm LDCs. The world economy consists of a developed core, which includes a few countries, and an underdeveloped periphery, which includes most other countries. The core is capital intensive. The periphery has a dual economy, including a small, relatively developed sector controlled by foreign interests and local elites who export labor-intensive goods to the core. The rest of the economy is underdeveloped. The core exports capital-intensive goods to the periphery. The core-periphery terms of trade harm the periphery. The periphery's development is distorted: industrialization is limited, and the masses remain poor. The setup is kept in place through explicit or implicit coalitions between the elites in the core and the periphery (Amin 1990 . Fifth, to attract foreign investment, states reduce public employment and privatize, raising unemployment and inequality. Sixth, financial openness is prone to crises due to volatile money movements across countries. In crises, the economy contracts, the tax base shrinks, welfare programs decline or cease, and many lose their jobs. The poor suffer more than the rich, and inequality rises (Germain 1997 GENERATING UNEQUAL ECONOMIC BENEFITS. One argument in the previous subsection was that the fear of forfeiting the economic benefits of globalization prevents civil war. This logic assumes implicitly that all groups benefit equally from economic openness and are, therefore, similarly motivated to refrain from violence. In international relations, some studies reason that since two states do not necessarily equally share the gains from economic interaction, globalization may not promote peace, and may even promote conflict (see Barbieri 2002 for review). Similarly, the gains and losses from globalization are distributed unequally among domestic actors. While neoclassical economics envisions the benefits of openness outweighing its costs, stylized observations suggest that winners typically do not compensate the losers unless compelled to do so by the government. When compensation is imperfect, the gap between winners and losers widens. Consequently, it is possible to argue that the fear of economic losses may not deter the losers of globalization.
Globalization Does Not Affect the Likelihood of Civil War
The argument that globalization has no effect on civil war is not explicit in the literature, but rather follows from studies arguing that economic globalization is not an important force for most countries. These arguments can be categorized into three groups. One group argues that the alleged extent of globalization is exaggerated, particularly for LDCs. A second group disputes the claim that the state is powerless relative to foreign economic forces or is unable to compensate losers. A third group argues that the effects of globalization vary across countries, depending upon the identity of losers and winners, and the nature of the local institutions.3
Implications and Previous Empirical Treatments
It is clear that the literature has conflicting expectations about the effect of globalization on civil war. All the views discussed above present face validity. Based on theoretical arguments alone, it is not possible to decide which of these sets of theories is most accurate. The expectations, therefore, need to be evaluated empirically. As it happens, the issue has not received much empirical-statistical attention so far. When the role of economic openness in civil war has been examined empirically, it has been treated as one of many control variables. To our knowledge, only two studies estimate the effect of globalization on civil war and they focus only on trade. Eighth, we study some of the covariates of civil war in the context of the globalization discourse. We have discussed two sets of theories. One set argues that globalization raises the risk of civil war; a second set argues the opposite. Given their assumptions, we cannot reject these sets of theories on theoretical grounds. Each of these sets expects a certain sign for the effect of globalization on civil war. We test each sign against the null hypothesis that globalization has no effect on civil war, by employing a one-tail test in reporting the results (for studies taking a similar approach see, e.g., Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares (1998), Li and
Reuveny (2003), Oneal and Russett (1999), and Reuveny and Li (2003)).
Finally, pooled designs such as ours may exhibit temporal dependence from the predominance of peace. Ignoring this issue can lead to a missing variable bias and serial correlation. With serial correlation, estimated coefficients are unbiased, but their standard errors are biased. We employ Beck, Katz, and Tucker's (1998) method to model the temporal dependence.4 We also confront the possibilities of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (whether or not temporal dependence is present). With heteroskedasticity, the estimated coefficients also are not biased, but their standard errors are. We deal with these risks by using White's (1980) estimator, to which we add the option of clustering over countries, generating consistent and robust standard errors under general conditions of serial correlation, and heteroskedasticity (Wiggins 1999 The data for the control variables, other than the temporal dependence measures, come from Fearon and Laitin (2003). Beginning with GDP Per Capita, it is generally expected that increases in this variable will reduce the grievances that make civil war more likely. Richer states are also able to allocate more resources to security, which reduces the risk of attack by rebels. Oil State is coded as 1 if a country's fuel exports are greater than one third of its total export, and zero otherwise. Vast oil reserves may create grievances over the distribution of benefits, financial incentives for rebels to gain power, targets for extortion, and funds to finance war, all of which should increase the likelihood of civil war.
Mountainous indicates the share of national areas that are mountainous. The assumption is that difficult terrains provide an advantage to rebels over government forces, raising the likelihood of civil war. Noncontiguous Territory is coded as 1 when national territories with at least 10,000 people are geographically separated from the capital city and 0 otherwise. Noncontiguous territories are thought to aid rebel efforts, since they make it more difficult for governments to service and monitor people, raising the likelihood of civil war.
Democracy measures the difference between the democratic and autocratic attributes of a state, reported in the Polity IV data set. On the one hand, democratic states are believed to be more responsive to the people's demands and less 5 See Interet Society at http://www.isoc.org/internet/history. Beginning in 1990, there are no states with missing data once they begin reporting Internet use, except Haiti in 1997. We code this point as missing. Using values from 1996, 1998, and their average did not change our result.
6 Internet use may not be an ideal measure of the ability of international organizations and other states to manage internal conflicts within another country. That said, the Internet has become a medium of communication and data transfer for some organizations and governments, as well as a source of information on other countries, which can enhance conflict resolution activities. likely to experience civil war. On the other hand, freedom creates opportunities of association and movement that would make rebellion easier. Some believe there is a curvilinear relationship (or an inverted U shape) between democracy and civil war. Political Instability is coded as 1 if the Polity IV regime scores changes at least three points during a three-year period, and 0 otherwise. Unstable states may appear weak and become the target of attack, increasing the likelihood of civil war.
Population denotes the logged population size, per year. It is generally argued that it is more difficult to govern and meet the demands of large populations, which raises the risk of civil war. Ethnic Fractionalization measures national ethnic homogeneity. It is an index that gives the likelihood of two randomly drawn people in a country belonging to different ethno-linguistic groups. Religious Fractionalization is analogous to the measure of ethnic homogeneity, but it focuses on the degree of religious homogeneity in a country. Both these variables are generally expected to raise the likelihood of civil war.7
Finally, Peace Years counts the number of years since the last civil war and is set to 0 during war. We also include three cubic spline variables. These controls for temporal dependence are generated by a program created by Tucker (1999). Table 1 presents results for civil war presence and Table 2 for civil war onset. In each Table, we first present the results for all the countries, and then for the LDCs. This is followed by a summary of related analyses reported in Appendix A.8 In Table 1 9 One might assume that this results from Internet's high correlation with GDP Per Capita, but that is not the case (r = .36). Rather, it reflects the lack of variation in Internet prior to 1990. Our results do not change when we remove Internet from the model. Notes: White robust standard errors adjusted for clustering over country appear in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. The cubic spline variables are included in the analyses, but not reported here.
Empirical Results
Turning to the control variables, the effect of GDP Per Capita is significant and negative, suggesting that we are less likely to see civil war in rich countries than in poor ones. We are also more likely to witness civil war in states with large, rather than small, populations, as given by the statistically significant and positive coefficient for Population.
Mountainous is found to be unrelated to War, while Noncontiguous Territory has a statistically significant and positive effect on civil war. Hence, having sections of the populations separated from central control raises the likelihood of civil war. Oil State lacks statistical significance, meaning that oil exporters are no more or less likely than others to experience a civil war.
The effect of Political Instability on War is negative and significant. While this result may appear counterintuitive, recall that this variable indicates that the Polity regime score has changed in recent years. That change may mean the state has become more or less democratic; it may also mean the government has more or less support. Our finding implies that post-change states may be better supported, better able to fend off attacks, or better able to satisfy people and prevent grievances that produce civil wars. The effects of Democracy, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Religious Fractionalization on civil war are not statistically significant, which mirrors the findings of others.
The coefficients of Peace Years and the three cubic spline variables (not reported here) are all statistically significant, indicating that temporal dependence is present in our sample. The negative coefficient for Peace Years tells us that states that enjoy a history of peace are less likely to experience civil war.
The Peace Years counter treats all civil war years as equal. In other words, a one-year war is treated the same as a 30-year war; both receive zeros for Peace Years. However, we may need to differentiate short and long periods of war, just as we differentiate short and long periods of peace. War Count in Model 2 counts the number of years that civil war has lasted, beginning with a 1 in the year after the war outbreak. It is reset to zero once peace has lasted for more than one year. Beginning with the control variables, our findings in Table 2 are consistent with the results obtained by Fearon and Laitin (2003) . The effects of GDP Per Capita, Notes: White robust standard errors adjusted for clustering over country appear in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. The cubic spline variables are included in the analyses, but not reported here.
Population, Mountainous, Oil State are significant and have the same signs as found in their study. The variables they deem insignificant-Noncontiguous Territory, Democracy, Peace Years, the splines, and Ethnic and Religious Fractionalization-are also insignificant here. The effect of Instability is positive, as in Fearon and Laitin's model, but is not significant, which is probably due to our smaller sample.
With the control variables behaving as expected, we turn to globalization. The results in Table 2 differ from those in Table 1 . Globalization has negligible effects on the onset of civil war. As Fearon and Laitin (2003) find, Trade does not affect the likelihood of civil war Onset. Other aspects of globalization also have no effect. The exception is found for FDI, which has a significant negative effect in Model 1. Yet, that effect disappears under further scrutiny. Models 3 and 4 reveal that globalization does affect the likelihood of civil war Onset.
The finding that globalization reduces the risk of civil war presence but does not affect the likelihood of civil war onset is intuitively appealing. The outbreak of civil war often reflects an intense state of emotions, anger, and a deep conviction that goals can only be achieved through force. The opposing side is equally resolved to respond in kind. In this atmosphere, actors may fail to allocate sufficient weight to the consequence of war, including economic losses. As the war continues, however, business will be disrupted, foreign investors will flee, and trade will decline. Losses will mount on both sides. As Oneal and Russett (2003) remind us recently, most theories of war assume that actors are rational. This means that actors continue to evaluate their decisions to wage war as new information becomes available. Our results are consistent with the notion that people will find civil war less desirable when faced with mounting losses due to the adverse effects of civil war on a country's ties to the world economy.
How large is the effect of globalization in reducing the risk of civil war presence? To answer this question, we estimate how much the probability that a state will experience civil war would change if it moved from the average level of some attribute of globalization to one standard deviation 
Conclusion
The literature has presented conflicting theoretical views on the effect of globalization on civil war. To the best of our knowledge, our analysis is the first attempt to assess statistically the debate from a large N sample. Globalization was measured from Trade, FDI, FPI, and Internet use. Civil war was measured as presence and onset. The analysis was conducted for all countries with available data, and for the LDCs alone. We covered the period 1970-99.
The results show that trade, FDI, and FPI reduce the likelihood of civil war presence for all states. Internet use reduces the likelihood of civil war presence only for the LDCs. Globalization does not affect the likelihood of civil war onset. These findings are found to be robust across different sensitivity analyses. Taken as a whole, our results suggest that actors initiating civil war do not consider globalization. However, they reassess their decisions about the civil war over time, as the losses that come with lost global ties mount.
Our results have important policy implications. In recent decades, nearly all civil wars have taken place in the LDCs. These countries tend to be less open to the world economy. We find that economic openness reduces the likelihood that civil war will be present in LDCs, but not the likelihood of its onset. Policies that raise per capita income, reduce population size, and reduce dependence on oil exports are likely to be the most effective strategies to reduce the risk of civil war outbreak. Economic openness is nevertheless recommended since it reduces the likelihood of ongoing civil war.
That said, efforts to integrate LDCs into the global economy must be done cautiously. All the arguments about the possible consequences of globalization for civil war have merits. While the pacifying forces of globalization are more apparent in our large N sample, it is still possible that globalization will worsen civil strife in individual cases, making civil war more likely.
Our paper, like all studies, must be viewed as the start of a journey, not its end. Future research may extend this analysis. For example, it would be beneficial to expand the historical domain of the study. Our preliminary research suggests that this would be a difficult project involving a large data collection effort from individual country sources.
Future research also may explore the reciprocal relationship between civil war and some of its determinants. So far, this issue has generally been handled by lagging the right hand side variables, as was done here. Estimating the reciprocal relationship within our context is likely to be difficult. The simultaneity of globalization and civil war involves at least four continuous variables and one dichotomous variable. To our best knowledge, the estimation algorithms required for this analysis are not yet available. Madalla's (1983) method comes closest, but his solution only works for models involving one dichotomous variable and one continuous variable.
Finally, future research may study microlevel processes within the state to understand the linkages between globalization and civil war. For example, we might imagine that globalization creates or diffuses tensions over the distribution of benefits within society. This paper has employed a nation-year level of analysis, which is the norm in the statistical civil war literature. New insights might be gained from going deeper into the national box.
